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Revisiting the typology of English copular clauses: ascription and 
specification in categorizing and identifying clauses 
Wout Van Praet and Kristin Davidse 
(KU Leuven – University of Leuven) 
 
Abstract 
In work on the typology of English copular clauses two main distinctions have been made: 
specificational versus ascriptive clauses and identifying versus predicative (which we call 
”categorizing”) clauses. In this article we argue that these two oppositions cannot be conflated. We 
propose to cross-classify copular clauses into four basic subtypes, namely specificational-identifying, 
specificational-categorizing, ascriptive-identifying and ascriptive-categorizing clauses. We show that 
the proposed typology provides an internally coherent characterization of the four basic subtypes of 
copular clauses, in particular of the neglected subtype of specificational clauses with an indefinite 
variable (i.e. specificational-categorizing clauses). Zooming in on categorizing clauses, we propose that 
their semantics are best captured in terms of a correspondence relation between instance and schema.  
 
1. Introduction: state of the art 1 
The typology of English copular clauses has been a topic of long-standing debate. Two main traditions 
can be found in the literature.  
One tradition views the opposition between ascriptive and specificational clauses as the main 
split (e.g. Akmaijan 1979; Higgins 1976; Huddleston and Pullum 2002; den Dikken 2006). The contrast 
resides here in the communicative function (Collins 1991: 5), which answers different (implied) 
questions and entails different focus assignment. The point of ascriptive clauses is to attribute a 
description to the subject, with the information focus, marked in bold, typically falling on the descriptive 
complement, i.e. very conservative in (1a) and a conservative in (1b).  
 
(1) a. Harry Potter is very conservative. 
b. Harry Potter is a conservative. (WB)2 
 
                                                 
1 The research reported on in this article was made possible by GOA-project 12/007, “The multiple functional 
load of grammatical signs”, awarded by the Research Council of The University of Leuven. We thank everyone 
who offered comments and feedback to the presentation of this material at the VCC Symposium 2013 
(University of la Rioja, Logroño) and at CSDL 2014 (University of California Santa Barbara.) We are 
particularly grateful to William Croft and Karen Lahousse for discussion of some issues central to this article. 
Needless to say, we are the only ones responsible for remaining errors of thought.  
2 Examples followed by (WB) were extracted from WordbanksOnline and are reproduced here with the permission 
of HarperCollins. Examples retrieved from the Internet are followed by their url. 
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Specificational clauses set up a pragmatically presupposed variable, e.g. the chief culprit in (2), to which 
they assign a specific value, Kim in (2), on which the information focus typically falls. 
 
(2)  (Which was the chief culprit?) Kim was the chief culprit. The chief culprit was Kim. 
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 266) 
 
The other tradition takes the opposition between predicative and identifying clauses to be the main one 
(e.g. Halliday 1967, 1994; Dik 1980; Declerck 1988; Langacker 1991; Stassen 1997). The basic 
semantic contrast is between categorizing versus identifying semantics, which entails that primary 
importance is assigned to the indefinite or definite status of the complements of be. In predicative clauses 
the complement, which is typically adjectival, e.g. very greedy (3a), or an indefinite nominal, e.g. a thief 
(3b), designates the category in terms of which the subject referent is classified. 
 
(3) a. Alice is very greedy. 
b. Alice is a thief. (Langacker 1991: 67) 
 
Identifying clauses “express that the referents of two definite terms [...] coincide in the same entity” 
(Dik 1980: 32), as is the case with Alice and the cat that stole the liver in (4).  
 
(4) Alice is the cat that stole the liver. (Langacker 1991: 67)  
 
In this article we argue against the view that these two oppositions largely coincide, as suggested by, for 
instance, den Dikken (2006: 3). Assuming such a coincidence leads to a number of – sometimes tacit – 
conflations that we reject.  
 Firstly, a number of authors seem to imply that specifying is the same thing as identifying. 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 266), for instance, state of Kim was the chief culprit (2), that it “serves 
to specify, or identify, who the chief culprit was” [emphasis ours]. This would, in turn, imply that 
specificational clauses exhaust the identifying type. Against this, authors such as Halliday (1967, 1994); 
Higgins (1976); Declerck (1988) and Stassen (1997) have convincingly argued for a second type of 
identifying clause in which a uniquely identifying description is given of the subject, as in (5).  
 
(5) Gary Megson is to appeal against the misconduct charge levelled against Albion… After Scott 
Dobie’s second goal, there was a scuffle in the penalty area, but Megson insists that Albion were 
the victims rather than the instigators. (WB) 
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We adhere to the position that identifying clauses can be either specificational, as in (2), or ascriptive, 
as in (5). We thus explicitly define the ascriptive subtype as also subsuming copular clauses with definite 
nominal complements of the subject, as in (5). 
Secondly, specifying clauses with an indefinite variable NP, like a familiar example in (6) have 
been viewed as identifying, for instance by Halliday (1967, 1985, 1994: 129).  
 
(6) Now a genus is a category of classification, a familiar example would be the genus equus, 
which contains the zebras, the horses and the donkeys. (WB) 
 
Here we are up against the flipside of the conflation between specification and identification that we 
reject. Example (6) does not have two NPs whose referents coincide in the same entity (Dik 1980: 32), 
that is, it is not an identifying clause. Rather, the genus equus refers to a more specific referent than a 
familiar example [of a genus], which designates a “generalized instance” (Langacker 2009) subsuming 
other more specific instances besides the genus equus, such as the genus canis. In specifying clauses 
with an indefinite variable NP like (6), the value thus refers to a specific instance of the more general 
schema designated by the variable, i.e. they involve a relation between an instance and its schema.  
 Thirdly, we argue that specificational clauses with an indefinite variable NP like (6) share their 
instance – schema semantics with the type of copular clause that is traditionally called “predicative”, 
i.e. ascriptive clauses with adjectival or indefinite nominal complement, as in Alice is very greedy (3a) 
and Alice is a thief (3b). The semantics of predicative clauses have traditionally been approached in 
terms of the logical model of “class inclusion” (e.g. Declerck 1988, Halliday 1994). However, class-
inclusion cannot offer a natural explanation of the gradability associated with predicative clauses 
(Declerck 1988: 61), e.g. (3a) Alice  is very greedy. By contrast, if we conceive of the relation between 
subject and predicative complement as a correspondence relation between instance and schema 
(Langacker 1991), then gradability is a natural feature of it (Davidse 1992). Equally importantly, the 
instance – schema semantic model allows one to generalize over the two copular types with indefinite 
NP, ascriptive ones with an indefinite descriptive complement like (3b) and specificational ones with an 
indefinite variable, like (6). To generalize over the instance – schema semantics of clauses like (3) and 
(6), we propose the term “categorizing” copular clauses. Just as identifying clauses can be either 
ascriptive or specificational, we hold that categorizing ones can be either ascriptive or specificational 
too.  
In taking this position, we reject a final, very widespread conflation in work on copular clauses, 
viz. that of ascriptive and predicative clauses (Huddleston & Pullum 2002): Instead, we define ascription 
as the communicative function contrasting with specification. The copulars with adjectival or indefinite 
nominal complement that are traditionally labelled “predicative” are ascriptive-categorizing in our 
approach. 
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To arrive at a typology that does justice to the coded meanings of the main subtypes and that 
brings out the main similarities and differences between the subtypes, we thus advocate a cross-
classificational approach. We argue in effect that two semantic oppositions defining four contrastive 
terms and a fourfold typology should be distilled from what is usually presented as a binary, or ternary, 
typology.3 As the two main semantic dimensions we take the two oppositions:  
i. ascriptive – specificational; 
ii. categorizing – identifying. 
Importantly, we partly redefine the four terms as outlined above (and developed further in this article) 
because we dissociate the two oppositions in which they figure from each other. We will show that these 
four terms define the following  basic subtypes of copular clause: 
1) ascriptive-categorizing, e.g. Alice is a thief. 
2) specificational-categorizing, e.g. A familiar example would be the genus equus. 
3) ascriptive-identifying, e.g. Albion were the victims rather than the instigators. 
4) specificational-identifying, e.g. The chief culprit was Kim. 
The article will be structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the semantic values and the main 
formal correlates of the four terms of our typology. In Section 3, we discuss the two types of identifying 
clauses. Section 4 concentrates on the two types of categorizing clauses with a focus on specificational-
categorizing clauses, which, even though the clause type has been commented on (e.g. Declerck 1988: 
49; Mikkelsen 2005: 154-155), has to our knowledge not been elucidated as the specificational 
counterpart of ascriptive-categorizing, or “predicative”, clauses. As the quantitative instantiation of 
categories is an intrinsic part of a usage-based description, we report on the relative frequencies of the 
four subtypes in an extensive random sample of 2,926 copular clauses in Section 5. The descriptive 
generalizations outlined in Sections 2 to 4 were verified by observing the patterns in this dataset. 
 
2 The terms of our crossclassificational typology  
2.1 Ascriptive - specificational 
The ascriptive – specificational opposition captures the contrasting functions of adding descriptive 
features to the subject versus specifying a value for a variable. On our understanding of these terms, the 
contrast between them is reflected in different semantic probes and distinct sets of syntactic alternations, 
and it correlates with different information structures as defaults.  
With ascriptive clauses the information focus is typically on the complement that ascribes 
descriptive features to the subject, which in our approach can be not only adjectival (7a) or an indefinite 
                                                 
3 Binary approaches are found in Huddleston & Pullum (2002), who distinguish ascriptive and specificational 
copulars, and in Dik (1980) and Langacker (1991), who contrast predicative with identifying clauses. A ternary 
typology is offered by Declerck (1988), who distinguishes predicative, descriptionally-identifying and 
specificationally-identifying clauses, and Halliday (1967, 1994), who opposes attributive to decoding-identifying 
and encoding-identifying clauses. 
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NP (7b) but also a definite NP (7c). The complement is probed by interrogative preforms such as how, 
what like, what type of, what, who, as illustrated below. 
 
(7) a. Harry Potter is very conservative. → How is Harry Potter? What is Harry Potter like? 
b. Harry Potter is a conservative → What/what type of citizen is Harry Potter? 
c. Harry Potter is the hawk of the lot. → Who/what type of citizen is Harry Potter in that group? 
 
This typical information structure may be overridden by contrastive focus on the complement, as in (7d).  
 
(7) d. (A) conservative/the hawk of the lot Harry Potter may be, but he is not a fascist. 
 
Syntactically, ascriptive clauses allow for fronting of their complement (Declerck 1988: 63), as in (7d), 
but they are not reversible in the sense of subject-complement switch (Huddleston 1984: 457), as shown 
by the fact that the erstwhile subject cannot receive the oblique case marking complements in English. 
With categorizing ascriptive clauses this is a formal impossibility: 
 
(7)  e. *Very conservative/A conservative is him.  
 
With identifying ascriptive clauses, subject-complement switch inevitably turns them into 
specificational clauses, which do not fit in the original context anymore. This is illustrated by (8b), 
which is the reversed variant of (8a). In this context, it makes no sense communicatively to set up the 
victims rather than the instigators as the pragmatically presupposed variable, whose value is then 
specified by Albion as in (8b). 
 
(8) a. Gary Megson is to appeal against the misconduct charge levelled against Albion… . After 
Scott Dobie's second goal, there was a scuffle in the penalty area, but Megson insists that Albion 
were the victims rather than the instigators. (WB) 
b. *the victims rather than the instigators were Albion/them. 
 
It is precisely because the clauses with indefinite (7b) and definite (7c) nominal complement share the 
same basic communicative function and the same syntactic behaviour that we propose that they can be 
generalized over as “ascriptive” copulars. 
 This generalization allows the natural accommodation of cases of ambiguity between a 
predicative and identifying reading. The most common form of structural ambiguity is that found with 
copular clauses whose complement contains a genitive or possessive determiner, as in (9), where Mr 
Tedeschi’s friend and his friend can in principle refer to either ‘the’ friend of Mr Tedeschi’s / his or to 
‘a’ friend of his. This structural ambiguity can be contextually disambiguated: in the context of this 
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example, the indefinite reading is more plausible because the ascriptive complement his colleague is 
unlikely to be a defining description. 
 
(9) ‘Are you Mr Tedeschi's friend?' I replied that I wasn't exactly his friend, more his colleague. 
(WB) 
 
This ambiguity led Keizer (1990: 1504) to question the soundness of Declerck’s (1988) distinction 
between predicative, i.e. ascriptive-categorizing, clauses and ascriptive-identifying clauses. In reaction 
to this criticism, Declerck (1990: 524) proposed treating such clauses as in principle ascriptive-
identifying clauses, while recognizing that sometimes the speaker deliberately “dodges giving precise 
identifying information” and instead uses a postcopular NP that is merely a property. However, the 
analysis of examples like (9) as identifying clauses may have been motivated by the apparent 
definiteness of NPs with genitive or possessive determiner, whereas they are in fact not overtly marked 
for definiteness in English (Willemse, Davidse & Heyvaert 2009: 16, 26). Hence, we propose to view 
clauses like (9) as being ambiguous out of context. On the reading in which the subject is the only friend 
of Mr Tedeschi the clause is identifying, while on the reading in which he is one of his friends – which 
is the most plausible in this context –, it is categorizing. 
 The kind of generalization that we propose for ascriptive-categorizing and ascriptive-identifying 
copular clauses is more generally accepted for specificational copulars. It has indeed been noted in the 
literature that values may be specified for both indefinite (10) and definite variable NPs (11) (e.g. 
Declerck 1988: 49; Halliday 1994: 129, Mikkelsen 2005: 154-155, Heycock 2012: 220). The 
information focus is typically on the NP referring to the value that is being specified for the variable and 
it is probed by interrogatives that select values from an implied set of alternatives: ‘which/who/what is 
the/an instance corresponding to the variable?’, as in Which is the chief culprit? Kim is the chief culprit 
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 266). Examples (10a) and (11a) provide contextualized examples of 
categorizing-specificational and identifying-specificational clauses with their probes (10b, 11b). As is 
generally recognized Huddleston 1984: 457; Higgins 1976; Declerck 1988; Halliday 1994; den Dikken 
2001), the crucial recognition criterion of specificational copular clauses in English is their reversibility: 
the possibility to assign the functions of subject and complement in the reverse way (Huddleston 1984: 
457). That the erstwhile subject really becomes the complement is shown by the oblique case it takes in 
the pronominal form: her in (12c) and him in (13c). (10c) and (11c) illustrate the reversal of the attested 
examples (10a) and (11a). The value NP typically remains the most salient new of the utterance and 
then receives the information focus in initial position. Even though the reversed order (10c)-(11c) is 
mostly somewhat less appropriate in a context where the non-reversed variant, e.g. (10a)-(11a), was 
originally selected, it is not communicatively nonsensical like the reversed variant (8b) of ascriptive-
identifying (8a), as shown by the pragmatic acceptability of Or in Valverde, the Hotel Boomerang is 
the best option for example (11c). 
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(10) a. the driver can call an OnStar technician who retrieves data from the car's computer to 
determine the problem. Many GM models come with this option installed; it's free for one year 
and renewable for $289 a year. An option is OnStar's personal calling service. (WB) 
b. What is an option? 
c. OnStar's personal calling service is an option. 
(11) a. Where to stay: the Parador El Hierro … has doubles from £80 a night, B&B. Or in Valverde, 
the best option is the Hotel Boomerang. (WB) 
b. Which is the best option? 
c. Or in Valverde, the Hotel Boomerang is the best option.  
(12) a. Who was an example of musical genius – Robert or Clara Schumann? 
 b. If anyone, she was an example of musical genius. 
 c. An example of musical genius was her, if anyone. 
(13) a. Who was the difficult one in that marriage?  
b. If anyone, he was the difficult one. 
c. The difficult one was him. 
 
Again, the default information structure can be overridden, amongst others when the value is realized 
by an anaphoric, non-contrastive pronoun, which is intrinsically given and unable to carry the 
information focus, as in (14) (Halliday 1967: 231).  
 
(14) (“what you’ve just said” –) // this is what I meant // (Halliday 1967: 231) 
  
As specificational constructions, these copulars alternate systematically with specificational clefts. It is 
generally accepted that specificational-identifying clauses alternate with pseudo-clefts and it-clefts and 
that, indeed, the possibility of constructing these corresponding clefts is a recognition criterion of the 
specificational nature of the copular clause (Declerck 1988: 10). Corresponding to (11a) the best option 
is the Hotel Boomerang, we can thus get both the pseudocleft (11d) and the it-cleft (11e). Note in this 
context that the possibility of probing (14) by an it-clefts shows the example to be specificational: what 
is it that you meant?  
 
(11) d. The one that is the best option is the Hotel Boomerang. 
e. It’s the Hotel Boomerang that is the best option. 
 
Since specificational-categorizing clauses have generally been overlooked as a type in their own right, 
the “indefinite” specificational clefts corresponding to them have not received much attention either. In 
fact, parallel to specificational-identifying clauses alternating with definite pseudo-clefts and it-clefts, 
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specificational-categorizing clauses alternate systematically with indefinite pseudo-clefts and with 
specificational there-clefts. Just as the variable in a specificational-categorizing clause (10a) is 
indefinite, the variable with restrictive relative clause in the pseudo-cleft alternate (10d) is headed by 
indefinite one. And as pointed out by Halliday (1967: 238) and Hannay (1985: 118-123), the indefinite 
counterpart of it-clefts is formed by specificational there-clefts like (10e): they non-exhaustively 
enumerate one or more instances corresponding to the variable expressed by the cleft relative clause.  
 
(10) d. One that is an option is OnStar's personal calling service. 
e. There’s OnStar's personal calling service that’s an option. 
 
The existence of these largely overlooked clefts further supports the logic of the similarly overlooked 
specificational-categorizing clauses. All these structures with indefinite variable share the function of 
non-exhaustive specification (Lambrecht 2001: 303): one or more instances are listed as corresponding 
to the variable, with the implicature that there may still be other values that satisfy the variable.  
 
2.2 Categorizing – identifying  
The categorizing-identifying dimension is to do with the contrast that has traditionally been conceived 
of as class-inclusion versus identity of reference.  
For identifying clauses we agree with Dik (1980: 32) that they “express that the referents of two 
definite terms [...] coincide in the same entity”. Identifying clauses have two definite NPs that are 
contextually co-referential: they apply to the same extralinguistic entities as in Kim was the chief culprit 
(2) and Alice is the cat stole the liver (4). Once this identity of reference has been established by an 
identifying clause, either NP can in principle be used in the following discourse to refer to the single 
extralinguistic referent in question. By contrast, between the definite, more specific NP and the 
indefinite, lexicosemantically more general NP in categorizing clauses like Alice is a thief (3b) no such 
co-referentiality is established. Alice can be used to refer to the specific cat with that name, but a thief 
is not uniquely identifying and does not pick out the specific instance in question. 
With regard to categorizing copulars, we argue that they are best accounted for in terms of a 
relation between instance and schema. This converges partly with the long tradition that has taken “class 
inclusion” as the semantic model of “predicative” clauses (e.g. Declerck 1988; Halliday 1994). It 
diverges from this tradition in two important respects. Firstly, we argue that “categorizing” semantics 
do not equal “predication” (or “ascription”), but can be construed either ascriptively or specificationally 
(Davidse 2010) (see below Section 4). Secondly, as pointed out in Davidse (1992), the gradability 
associated with categorizing clauses is better accounted for by the relation of instantiation than by the 
logical notion of cut-and-dried class membership.  
More specifically, we conceive of the semantics of categorizing clauses in terms of conformity, 
or correspondence, between instance and schema. To conceive of the instance – schema relation, we 
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follow Langacker (1991) in viewing superordination (type – subtype) and instantiation (type – instance) 
as one continuum, in which “the lowest level in a type hierarchy consists of specific instances” 
(Langacker 1991: 61). This continuum is defined by progressive semantic specification in the direction 
from type to subtypes to instances, and by increasing semantic generality, or schematicity, in the 
direction from instances to types to more general types. An example of such a unified superordination 
– instantiation continuum is given in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. A unified superordination - instantiation continuum. 
In the superordination relation between marsupial and kangaroo, the concept [marsupial] is more 
general and its semantic contents less precise than the concept [kangaroo]. Likewise, the step from the 
type kangaroo to an instance a kangaroo entails semantic specification: the common noun on its own 
designates a pure “virtual” type, whereas a full NP with a determiner designates an instance related in 
some way to the speech exchange (Langacker 1991: 33). The final step to a specific instance, Skippy, 
again involves a more elaborate conception, as its semantic value is not limited to its being a particular 
instance of kangaroo but also includes more precise specifications relating to the pet’s individual 
characteristics in the well-known Australian children’s series (Langacker 1991: 61).  
Importantly, the correspondence relation between instance and schema allows a more natural 
explanation of the gradability associated with categorizing clauses than class-membership. Classes are 
“logical bounded entities membership in which is defined by an item's possession of a simple set of 
criterial (i.e. necessary and sufficient) features, in which all instances possessing the criterial attributes 
have a full and equal degree of membership” (Rosch & Mervis 1975: 573-574). A schema, on the other 
hand, designates a “prototypical category, [which] exhibit[s] degrees of typicality – not every member 
is equally representative for a category – and a family resemblance, in which each item has at least one, 
and probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements are common 
to all items” (Rosch & Mervis 1975: 574-575). The idea of more prototypical versus more peripheral 
instances of a schema translates directly into gradability, which as observed by (Declerck 1988: 61) is a 
distinguishing feature of predicative clauses, observable with both adjectival and nominal predicative 
complements, as in (15)-(16).  
 
(15) Would you like rolls? They 're a little stale; yesterday’s. (WB) 
(16) I’m not much of a clergyman. My sermons tend to resemble legal arguments. I'm awkward at 
pastoral work. I try to avoid the poor. I think too much about cultivating the people who matter. 
In fact although I'm so successful I'm really rather a failure. (WB) 
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The categorizing clause in (16) rates yesterday’s rolls on the scale of “staleness” implied in the 
complement. In (17) by calling himself not much of a clergyman, the speaker categorizes himself as a 
very peripheral example of the category “clergyman”. Grading the ascriptive complement presupposes 
a view in which instances are evaluated as having more or fewer features of the schema they are related 
to. Gradability is less naturally accounted for in the traditional view which determines class membership 
in terms of a fixed set of necessary and sufficient features.  
Adjectival complements, as in (15), clearly designate type specifications which are ascribed to 
the subject, and hence categorize its referent. Categorizing clauses with adjectival phrases can only be 
construed ascriptively because an adjective cannot function as a variable NP: its inability to become a 
subject prevents the clause from being reversible in the sense of Subject-Complement switch that is 
criterial for specificational clauses. However, how precisely a NP, like a thief in (17), realizes schema-
semantics in a categorizing clause has to be spelt out more precisely. As stressed by Langacker (1991: 
67) a thief in (17) designates an instance. Only a common noun on its own designates a type but “a full 
nominal designates a grounded instance of that type, i.e. an instance distinguished from others and 
situated with respect to speaker/hearer knowledge” (Langacker 1991: 33). As we will argue below 
(Section 4), the fact that an indefinite NP with a common noun designates “an instance of the type T 
designated by the noun” helps explain why it can function either as an ascriptive complement or as a 
variable NP in categorizing clauses4. In this section, however, we will limit ourselves to establishing 
why clauses with an indefinite ascriptive complement like (17) convey categorizing (instance-schema) 
semantics and those with a definite one like (18) identifying semantics.  
 
(17) Alice is a thief. (Langacker 1991: 67) 
(18) Alice is the cat that stole the liver. (Langacker 1991: 67) 
 
As pointed out by Langacker (1991: 67-68) part of the semantic contrast between (17) and (18) is caused 
by the different grounding predications of the nominal predicates. In (17) the signals a contextually 
unique referent, which is evident to both speech-act participants. The copular verb in (18) thus links two 
specific, separately characterized individuals, establishing contextual co-referentiality, or identity, 
between them. (17), by contrast, has the indefinite complement NP a thief. As argued with regard to the 
instantiation continuum illustrated in Figure 1, the instance designated by an indefinite nominal like a 
thief is intrinsically semantically more general than a specific instance like Alice. Moreover, the 
indefinite complement in (17) designates “an arbitrary member of the thief category” (Langacker 1991: 
                                                 
4 Because the indefinite variable NP in categorizing clauses such as An option is OnStar’s personal calling 
service designates a grounded instance of that type, i.e. an instance distinguished from others and situated with 
respect to speaker/hearer knowledge, the required presupposition of existence can attach to it (Declerck 1988: 
15, 20-21). 
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67). It is arbitrary in the sense that this instance conception is “‘conjured up’ by the speaker and hearer 
solely for purposes of making a type attribution, and has no status outside the confines of this predicate 
nominative construction” (Langacker 1991: 68). Hence, the semantics of (17) can be glossed as “Alice 
is an arbitrary member of the type or schema thief”, i.e. “Alice instantiates the schema [thief]”. 
The lexical material in the complement NPs contributes further to the semantic contrast between 
copulars like (17) and (18). Because both are ascriptive copulars, the descriptive material of the 
complement NP is more general than the meaning of the subject in both the categorizing (17) and 
identifying (18) clause. However, construing an identifying complement imposes specific pragmatic 
requirements on the selection of its type specifications: they should be informative enough to function 
as a uniquely identifying description in the given context. This is why definite NP complements function 
in a defining way in copular clauses. In (18) the detailed type specifications cat that stole the liver are 
chosen to identify Alice in a way that distinguishes her from any other cats in the discourse context. By 
contrast, in indefinite NPs the type specifications are not chosen with the pragmatic motivation of 
providing a uniquely identifying description. In ascriptive clauses like (17), the function of the NP with 
the lexicosemantically more general type specifications, e.g. a thief, is purely classificational. There is 
no implicature that there may not be other instances of “thieving cats” in the discourse context. 
We propose that the type “thief” in the complement NP provides the “sanctioning structure” 
(Langacker 1987: 92) that enables recognition of Alice as an instance of the type “thief”. Features of 
Alice correspond to the features that are predicated by the noun thief in the complement. It is this 
“correspondence”, or “matching”, relation (Langacker 1991: 90-94) between instance and schema that 
we claim characterizes the semantics of “categorizing” clauses like (16) to (18). They assess the – 
gradable – conformity between a specific instance and the more general schema contained in the 
indefinite NP of categorizing clauses. 
 After having disentangled ascription – specification and categorization – identification as two 
distinct oppositions in this section, we will show in the next sections that cross-classification of the four 
terms enables a more internally coherent description of copular clauses. In Section 3, we set out the 
analysis of the two types of identifying clause and, in Section 4, of the two types of categorizing clause.  
 
3 Ascriptive-identifying and specificational-identifying clauses 
In this section we argue, like Stassen (1998: 104-106), for the distinction between ascriptive-identifying 
and specificational-identifying as made by Higgins (1976) and Declerck (1988).5 We will consider, in 
order, reversibility as the criterion distinguishing between the two types (Section 3.1), differences in the 
referential status of the two NPs (Section 3.2), different implicatures with regard to exhaustiveness 
(Section 3.3), and typical information structures (Section 3.4).  
 
                                                 
5 Declerck (1988) uses the terms descriptionally-identifying vs. specificationally-identifying for this distinction. 
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3.1 Reversibility of specificational-identifying clauses 
Ascriptively-identifying clauses add to their subject a definite description realized by a uniquely 
identifying NP, e.g. the best in (19). Specificational-identifying clauses specify a value for a definite 
variable, e.g. the pretty one  in (20), whose meaning is paraphraseable as “the X who is the pretty one” 
(Declerck 1988: 5). The two identifying types of copular clauses display the syntactic behaviour 
described for ascriptive and specificational clauses in Section 2.1. Ascriptive clauses allow fronting of 
their complement with contrastive focus, as in (19b), but not re-assignment of the subject and 
complement functions (19c). Conversely, specificational-identifying clauses allow subject-complement 
switch (20b) but not fronting of the complement, (20c). (The role of focus assignment in the possible 
and impossible alternates will be discussed further in Section 3.4.)  
 
(19) a. Ella, I see Ana as one of the best players in the world. I mean, she may not be the best, but 
one of the best she certainly is. (http://www.womenstennisblog.com/2009/10/03/ana-ivanovic-
puts-an-end-to-2009-tennis-season/)  
b. the best he may not be, but capable, Gambit most certainly is 
(http://www.killermovies.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-324923-the-best-leader-of-the-x-
men.html) 
 c.*the best is not her/him 
(20) a. The pretty one is my daughter. The ugly one is me. 
(https://myspace.com/gambitthebandit/photos) 
b. More importantly, we now have confirmation that out of Sam and Dean, Dean is the pretty 
one. (http://io9.com/5673069/supernaturals-twilight-spoof-transcends-parody-and-becomes-a-
work-of-greatness) 
c. *The pretty one my daughter/Dean is.  
 
An important caveat regarding reversibility as a recognition criterion of specificational-identifying 
clauses is that it does not apply to so-called reduced it-clefts, e.g. (21a) and (22a), which structurally can 
always be reformulated as it-clefts (22a), (22b). We follow (Declerck 1990: 525-526) in analysing such 
examples as specificational-identifying clauses whose variable is not overtly realized by a cleft relative 
clause. The variable may be either textually evoked, as in (21a), where it is Vexille actually repeats the 
it-cleft of the preceding text in reduced form, or inferrable from the preceding discourse (Kaltenböck 
2005), as in (22a).  
 
(21) a. Then he felt a pulse of excitement at the thought that it might truly be Guy Vexille who rode 
unsuspecting towards the fight. “If it is Vexille,” Sir Guillaume said, fingering the awful scar 
on his face, “then he’s mine to kill.” (WB) 
b. If it is Vexille who is riding towards the fight. 
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(22) a. I noticed for the first time that I was aching all over and that I had a deepish cut on my forearm. 
I couldn't think how I'd got it. Perhaps it was the glass from the vase. (WB)  
b. Perhaps it was the glass from the vase that had cut my forearm.   
 
3.2 Referential status of NPs 
Typically, the two NPs in identifying clauses have a different referential status, which following 
Declerck (1988: 47) we characterize in terms of weakly referring versus strongly referring NPs, a 
contrast inspired by Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between the “referential” and “attributive” use of 
definite descriptions. The speaker uses a definite description as a strongly referring NP, if that 
description enables the hearer to pick out the exact thing spoken about in some world. For instance, if 
the sentence Smith's murderer must be insane is uttered at the trial of the perpetrator, Smith's murderer 
is a strongly referring NP, because it identifies, for the people present, the exact person spoken about. 
The definite NP Smith's murderer can also be used as a weakly referring NP in a context in which 
someone, hearing the atrocious details of Smith's murder, says Smith's murderer must be insane, without 
having any idea who actually did it. The speaker simply gives a definite role specification which applies 
to whoever it was that killed Smith. This definite description does not allow the hearer to pick out the 
right person in reality.  
In specificational-identifying clauses, the variable NP is, as observed by Declerck (1988: 47), 
inherently weakly referring. This is clearly illustrated with a context like that of the ceremony of the 
Academy Awards, where the speaker tears open the envelope containing the winner's name at the very 
moment of uttering And the winner is .... . To the variable the winner attaches a presupposition of 
existence to the effect that there is one specific winner, but the NP does not give mental access to the 
actual identity of the winner. The value is typically strongly referring, as in a paradigm case like (23), 
in which the actual winner is identified by a proper name. However, the value for a variable may also 
be specified by a weakly referring definite description such as the person who makes his structure 
prevail in (24). 
 
(23) And the winner is… Cate Shortland. (WB) 
(24) A power struggle ensues, and the winner is the person who makes his structure prevail. (WB) 
 
In ascriptive-identifying clauses, the subject is typically strongly referring, picking out a specific 
individual, like Marble Arch in (25) and he, referring to Bill, in (26), while the complement may be 
weakly referring, like where people used to be hanged in (25), or strongly referring as in that man over 
there (26) (Declerck 1988: 107). Exceptionally, the two NPs of ascriptive-identifying clauses may both 
be weakly referring, as in (27).   
 
(25) I recalled reading somewhere that Marble Arch was where people used to be hanged. (WB) 
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(26) Bill? Who’s Bill? – He’s that man over there. (Declerck 1988: 107)  
(27) But the most important piece of equipment is the one you can least afford. (Halliday 1985: 118). 
 
3.3 Presence or absence of exhaustiveness implicature 
There is general agreement in the literature that specificational-identifying clauses have an 
exhaustiveness implicature: hearers will take it that the values corresponding to the variable have been 
listed exhaustively (e.g. Halliday 1967: 225; Lambrecht 2001: 303). For instance, on hearing And the 
winner is… Cate Shortland (23), the audience will not expect there to be a second winner. Declerck 
(1988: 28) argues that this is a conversational implicature, which can still be cancelled. If a child is told 
What you need is a smack on the bottom, s/he has a right to conclude that a smack on the bottom is all 
s/he needs and that there will not be any extra form of punishment. If this “exhaustiveness” presumption 
proves to be unfounded, the utterance cannot be said to have been false. Rather “although technically 
true”, it “is deceiving because it is not as informative as it should be, and therefore violates one of Grice's 
(1975) principles of conversation” (Declerck 1988: 30). 
 Importantly, ascriptive-identifying clauses do not have this exhaustiveness implicature: there is 
no suggestion that the ascriptive complement is the only one that descriptionally identifies the subject 
referent (Declerck 1988: 107). In this sense, ascriptive identification is open-ended. Additional definite 
descriptions may be added without thwarting any “exhaustiveness” implicature. Even when an 
ascriptive-identifying example contains several descriptions, as in (28), there is no sense that this list is 
exhaustive.  
 
(28) Mr Andrew Hunter, Conservative MP for Basingstoke. Well Andrew Hunter is the Conservative 
M P for Basingstoke and, more importantly in this context, chairman of the Tory backbench 
Northern Ireland committee. Andrew good afternoon to you. (WB) 
 
3.4 Typical information structures 
A number of authors have raised the point that it is not always easy to distinguish ascriptive-identifying 
clauses from specificational-identifying clauses (e.g. Keizer 1990, 1991; Patten 2012: 60). For instance, 
Keizer (1990: 1051-1053) raises queries with regard to clauses of the form it/he is + proper name6. In 
reaction to the criticisms by Keizer (1990) of Declerck (1988), Declerck (1990) relaxed his earlier 
conceptual definition, which was that ascriptive-identifying clauses ascribe a uniquely identifying 
description to the subject referent, which distinguishes it from all other entities. Firstly, he tied 
ascriptive-identifying clauses to specific conceptual contexts, proposing that “[t]hey are typically used 
after the act of specification has taken place and are meant to give further information about the entity 
                                                 
6 Above an example of the form it be + proper name (21) was discussed, while two examples of the form 
she/which one is + proper name are looked at more closely below in (33) – (34).  
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that has been specified as a value” (Declerck 1990: 521-2), as in (29). Contexts in which ascriptive-
identifying clauses are used certainly include ones in which the hearer is given a description that will 
back up with real ‘familiarity’ (cf. Lyons 1999: 5-6) his or her knowledge of a definite referent that 
hitherto had merely been mentally stored, as in example (29). However, this type of context is not the 
only one for ascriptive-identifying clauses, as shown by the range of examples (25)-(27) discussed in 
the previous section. 
 
(29) A. Who won the first prize? 
 B. It was Deirdre (who won the first prize). 
 A. Deirdre? Who’s Deirdre? 
 B. She’s my neighbor’s daughter7. (Declerck 1990: 522) 
 
Secondly, he stated that they may not fully identify the subject, but allow to “build up a backing of 
descriptions, to make the full identification possible” (Declerck 1990: 524). This may have contributed 
to further confusion about the type.  
We advocate upholding the definition of ascriptive-identifying clauses as providing a uniquely 
identifying description of the subject. However, what is at stake is not a philosophical kind of 
identification distinguishing the entity in question “from all other entities”. Rather, it is contextual 
identification that is at stake: the assignment of a defining description, which may be in contrast with 
just one other potential defining description, as in example above, Albion were the victims rather than 
the instigators (5), or which may be one (or more) from an indefinite number of unique descriptions, as 
in Andrew Hunter is the Conservative M P for Basingstoke and, more importantly in this context, 
chairman of the Tory backbench Northern Ireland committee (28). We hold that the difference between 
ascriptive and specificational identifying clauses is determined by the distinct communicative functions 
of adding a contextually identifying description to the subject versus specifying a value for a 
pragmatically presupposed variable. In this section, we will show that careful consideration of the 
information distribution in real text examples much aids the analyst to determine whether the identifying 
clause is of the ascriptive or specificational type.  
Following Gundel (1988) we can distinguish between two dimensions of information structure: 
a referential one and a relational one. The referential dimension is concerned with the activation status 
of referents in the discourse and involves the extent to which the addressee can be presumed to be 
familiar with the referents referred to by the speaker. Kaltenböck (2005) operationalizes this distinction 
in terms of information that is retrievable or not from the preceding discourse, with a basic opposition 
between discourse-given and discourse-new information. The relational dimension of information 
                                                 
7 As discussed in Section 2.2, (29) is in fact ambiguous between an ascriptive-categorizing and an ascriptive-
identifying reading  
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structure concerns the specific relation between linguistic elements and (other elements of) the 
proposition in which they are expressed. For our current purposes, we can operationalize this as the 
relation between focus and background. The focus is “that information which is relatively the most 
important or salient in the given communicative setting, and considered by S to be most essential for A 
to integrate into his pragmatic information” (Dik 1997: 326). It is marked by tonic prominence in spoken 
language. The information with respect to which some element of the proposition is focused, may be 
either presupposed or new. The referential and relational dimensions typically (but not necessarily) 
interact with each other: if an utterance is to be informative, it needs to add information to the discourse 
(cf. Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims), because of which discourse-new information is usually the 
most informative and therefore typically receives the information focus.  
Ascription and specification correlate by default with information focus on the ascriptive 
complement and the value respectively, and typically, the focal element will contain discourse-new 
information. In this section, we show how these typical information structures shed light on the two 
identifying clause types in addition to the alternation tests.  
Let us first return to ascriptive-identifying example (5), reproduced here as (30).  
 
(30) Gary Megson is to appeal against the misconduct charge levelled against Albion… . After Scott 
Dobie's second goal, there was a scuffle in the penalty area, but Megson insists that Albion were 
the victims rather than the instigators. (WB) 
 
Homing in on the discursive embedding of the copular clause in terms of discourse-givenness and 
discourse-newness, we see how Albion is first associated with alleged misconduct, which Megson denies 
by stating that in the scuffle Albion were the victims rather than the instigators. The contrastive 
information in the complement is in Kaltenböck’s (2005) terms new-anchored. As to the information 
structure of the copular clause itself, ascriptive subject and complement map onto given and focal 
information, which is the default for ascriptive-identifying clauses. The discursive embedding and the 
speaker’s main concern with the “victims” status of Albion rule out a specificational reading here. As 
Stassen (1997) puts it, “the speaker intends to add knowledge to a file [i.e. Albion] which he assumes is 
already present with the hearer […] and hereby offer[s] a new piece of information for it [i.e. the victims 
rather than the losers]” (Stassen 1997: 103).  
By contrast, the identifying clauses in (31) are specificational-identifying clauses, as shown by 
the possibility of replacing them by it-clefts in their own contexts: it’s the accountants that are the big 
winners, it’s you and me who are the losers. The preceding context mentions largely fictive sales, 
involving profit and investment. This creates the inferential ground from which the big winners and the 
losers can be pragmatically presupposed as variables of the identifying clauses (Lambrecht 2001: 474) 
If read aloud, the tonic prominence signalling information focus naturally falls on the values the 
accountants and you and me, which occur in their unmarked, clause-final position. In the spoken 
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example (32) the speakers are presumably involved in a game, in which the one who first shows their 
teeth or tongue loses. In this context, the loser is the presupposed variable for which a value is sought, 
as also shown by the corresponding cleft it’s Tom who’s the loser. (32) exemplifies the variant in which 
the value is the subject and receives clause-initial information focus. 
 
(31) HOLLOW SWAPS: Telecom companies with room on their airwaves "sell" their spare capacity 
to each other. No cash changes hands but the 'sale' goes into the books of the selling company 
as profit and into the buying firm as 'investment'. Besides the bosses, who cash in on short-term 
share price gains, the big winners are the accountants. They get paid for dreaming up tax 
wheezes-and when companies finally go belly up they cash in as the receivers. The losers are 
you and me with shares and pensions linked to these firms. (WB) 
(32) Saw your tongue <others laugh> Yeah. Right. Tom is the loser. (WB) 
 
With examples (33)-(34) we turn to identifying clauses whose subject is a pronoun and whose 
complement is a proper name. The preceding context of (33) involves detectives trying to find out the 
identity of the victim, the woman designated by the strongly referring pronoun she. The complement of 
the underlined copular clause links the new and defining information of the woman’s name, Mrs Billie 
Pavane to the subject she. This is a typical context for an ascriptive-identifying clause, and, indeed, it is 
followed by what is very clearly an ascriptive-identifying clause, She's the wife of the American 
Ambassador. The alternation tests confirm the ascriptive reading of the underlined copular: the 
contrastive complement can be fronted, Mrs Billie Pavane she is, but subject-complement switch is not 
possible in this context: *Mrs Billie Pavane is her. By contrast, in the underlined identifying clause in 
(34) the proper name Mr Tedeschi is the pragmatically presupposed variable: the nurse has this name in 
mind and seeks to assign one of the two males in the context to it, Christian or the narrator, as signalled 
by the ‘selective’ interrogative pronoun which. In an interrogative it is the wh-element which 
corresponds to the value.  
 
(33) 'So she's not - ' Clements looked at his notebook; he still carried it like an old family heirloom. 
'Not Mrs Belinda Paterson?' 'No. She’s Mrs Billie Pavane. She's the wife of the American 
Ambassador.' (WB) 
(34) The nurse came out. At first Christian didn't notice, though. He'd got so involved in his tirade 
and was staring at me in this very intense way. Finally she interrupted to ask which one of us 
was Mr Tedeschi. Christian went silent and the blood drained from his face again. He made a 
feeble signal with his hand, then got up and shuffled along behind the nurse. (WB) 
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Fairly exceptionally, examples of identifying clauses cannot be contextually disambiguated because 
they allow two possible ways of analysing the discursive embedding of their NPs. In (35) That’s your 
real interest is such an example.  
 
(35) What I mean is, isn't there something that engrosses you, something you must achieve?’ ‘I don't 
have kind of ambition.`… ‘So it's your job after all. That’s your real interest, your job. (WB) 
 
Its two NPs, anaphoric that, referring to your job, and your real interest are both discourse-given, as the 
preceding text mentions both your job and something that engrosses you, something you must achieve. 
The copular clause is preceded by a reduced it-cleft, which specifies your job for the implied variable 
‘that engrosses you’. The following copular clause can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it 
can be read as repeating the previous specification, i.e. with that as non-contrastive, anaphoric value and 
your real interest as variable. It then has the marked information pattern with information focus on the 
variable pointed out by Halliday (1967: 231) for this is what I meant, example (14) above. On the other 
hand, the example can be interpreted as an ascription following the specification made in the preceding 
reduced it-cleft. That is, your real interest then gives a description that uniquely defines that, referring 
to your job, in this context. In both readings the information focus is on your real interest. 
 
3.5 Interim conclusion 
The description of ascriptive-identifying and specificational-identifying clauses developed in Section 3 
provides us with recognition criteria to assign readings to examples in context: possible and impossible 
alternates (3.1), referential status of the two NPs, (3.2), presence or absence of the exhaustiveness 
implicature (3.3) and typical information structures (3.4). As we will see in Section 5, where we report 
on our data analysis, these criteria and typical patterns allowed us to assign the identifying clauses in 
our dataset to either the ascriptive or specificational subtype in most cases, leaving only a small fraction 
of contextually supported ambiguous cases. 
 
 
4 Ascriptive-categorizing and specificational-categorizing clauses 
Focusing on the same issues as we did for specificational-identifying and ascriptive-identifying clauses 
in the previous section, we will now set out the differences between the specificational-categorizing type 
and the ascriptive-categorizing one, while also showing how they are moulded by the semantics of 
instance-schema correspondence. This is essential to our claim that the specificational clauses with 
indefinite variable discussed in this section should be subsumed under the categorizing, not the 
identifying, type. In Section 4.1, we show that specificational-categorizing clauses allow for 
reversibility. In Section 4.2, we describe the kind of indefinite reference associated with the complement 
in the ascriptive type, and the variable in the specificational type. In Section 4.3, we look into the non-
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exhaustiveness implicature of specificational-categorizing clauses, while in Section 4.4, we show how 
recognition of the two types is aided by their different typical information structures. Finally, we discuss 
gradability as a feature associated with the two types of categorizing clauses (Section 4.5).  
 
4.1 Reversibility of specificational-categorizing clauses 
The two categorizing types display, just as much as the two identifying types, the syntactic behaviour 
characterizing ascription versus specification (Section 2.1). Examples (36a-b) illustrate the non-
reversibility of ascriptive categorizing clauses, which has always been taken as a recognition criterion 
of what are traditionally called “predicative” clauses (Declerck 1988: 62). Examples (37a-b) by contrast 
illustrate the reversibility of an example with an indefinite variable NP and a definite value NP. In (37a), 
the Gulf War is subject and a good example complement, while in (37b) we find the opposite functional 
assignment but the same information structure. Both examples are hence shown to be specificational.  
 
(36) a. ... allied air forces destroyed key targets in and around Baghdad and bombed Iraq's armed 
forces entrenched within and around Kuwait, after which coalition ground forces quickly 
overran the remaining enemy troops. In military terms, the Gulf War was an overwhelmingly 
one-sided event (Airospace Power Journal 2001: fall 01: 43, War termination in the Persian 
Gulf: Problems and Prospects, M. Garrard) 
b. *an overwhelmingly one-sided event was the Gulf War.  
(37) a. In applying the principles to interventions in the New World Order it's reasonable to predict 
that the above principles will more often than not decide against U.S. and UN interventions. 
The Gulf War is a good example. (http://solidarity-us.org/site/node/2480) 
b. Yeah, other than Russia (who's worse off than China), there is no other threat in Asia to us. 
What can India and Vietnam do? China can even outnumber us with a standing army- our tech 
is far too advanced to be overwhelmed by a bunch of foot soldiers shooting at jets and rockets 
in the sky … Also, a good example is the Gulf War – we destroyed Iraq's military within a 
few days. 250,000 Iraqi troops, dead. How many U.S. soldiers? About 250. 
(https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100915145626AAFQLvv) 
 
That examples like these are specificational has never been denied in the literature, but their semantics 
have, to our knowledge, not been viewed so far as fundamentally of the “categorizing” type (on our 
definition). Halliday (1994: 129), for instance, treats them as identifying. In such an approach it is 
overlooked that they share the semantics of “correspondence between instance and schema” with 
categorizing ascriptive clauses, and form a logical subtype of “categorizing” clause.  
By the same token, we propose that specificational-categorizing clauses impose a different 
directionality on the correspondence relation between instance and schema than ascriptive-categorizing 
clauses. Because of their different communicative functions, they answer different implied questions.  
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Ascriptive-categorizing clauses take the instance referred to by the subject as point of departure: 
the implied question corresponding to their communicative function is: under what schema can the 
instance be categorized? That is, starting from a specific instance, they abstract away from its specifics, 
to recognize the general features of the schema in it. The type specifications of the schema contained in 
the complement serve the function of type-attribution (Langacker 1991: 68) to the subject. For instance, 
in (36), the complement attributes the type specifications overwhelmingly one-sided event to the instance 
referred to by the subject, the Gulf War. This categorization adds information to the addressee’s 
knowledge of the subject referent.  
By contrast, the implied question answered by a specificational assertion is: which value(s) 
satisfy (Lambrecht 2001), or “qualify for”, the variable. The type specifications conveyed (and implied) 
by the variable NP function as a set of criteria, so to speak, that the value must meet. The correspondence 
relation hence takes as logical point of departure the variable stipulating the criteria to be met by 
instances “satisfying the variable”. The meaning of (37a) can be paraphrased as the Gulf War being a 
“qualifying” example [of a non-UN-approved military intervention], and that of (37b) as a “qualifying” 
example [of the US’s technological military power] being the Gulf War. The order in which the 
specificational relation is presented is of no direct importance to the assertion: saying that value x is a 
qualifying example of the variable, as in (37a), or that a qualifying example of the variable is value x, 
as in (37b), boils down to the same assertion.  
 
4.2 Indefinite reference in specificational vs. ascriptive-categorizing clauses 
In this section, we look more closely at the referential status of the indefinite complement NP in 
ascriptive-categorizing clauses and the indefinite variable NP of specificational-categorizing clauses. 
As we saw in Section 2.2, Langacker (1991: 67) analyses the complement of ascriptive-
categorizing clauses such as Alice is a thief as conveying non-specific indefinite reference. He (1991: 
104-106) characterizes the meaning of non-specific indefinite reference (39) in contrast with indefinite 
specific (38) and generic indefinite (40) reference. In his view, both specific and non-specific indefinite 
reference “establish mental contact between H [hearer] and an instance ti of [type] T ” (Langacker 1991: 
104), even though the instance is in neither case uniquely identifiable in relation to the current discourse 
space. Specificity “pertains to whether the speaker (S) […] has some pre-existing or independent mental 
contact with ti” (Langacker 1991: 104). As Bache (2000: 179) puts it, with indefinite specific reference 
“a particular referent answering the description of the noun group is picked out specifically”, as in (38), 
in which an eligible bachelor “does not simply refer to a random member of the class” of bachelors, but 
to a specific individual, which, after its first mention in the discourse by this indefinite NP is referred to 
by him. Non-specific reference merely “represents an arbitrary instance of T” which “is ‘conjured up’ 
for a particular immediate purpose and has no status outside the special mental space thereby created” 
(Langacker 1991: 104), as in (39), where ‘an’ instance of eligible bachelor figures in the mental space 
of (some) women’s – as yet unsuccessful – search for ‘such a’ man. The profile of an instance is needed 
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merely to embody the relevant type specifications associated with the T eligible bachelor – such as 
“male, unmarried, attractive, wealthy, well-connected”, etc. – in the virtual mental space of (some) 
women’s hopes and desires. An indefinite non-specific NP does not designate a specific individual 
(Bache 2000: 179), but merely an arbitrarily conjured up instance of the type. An indefinite generic as 
in (40) do[es] not imply either that “S or H has any pre-existing mental contact with the instance 
designated by the a-marked nominal: the instance […] is thought of as a representative instance of the 
category rather than a particular instance” (Langacker 1991: 106). An indefinite generic NP evokes an 
instance of T in order to “represent the speaker’s conception of how the world is structured” (Langacker 
1991: 106). 
 
(38) A couple of weekends ago, I exchanged numbers with an eligible bachelor. His last words (via 
text message) were “speak soon”. (WB) (specific) 
(39) Fewer and fewer women are spending all their waking time looking for an “eligible bachelor”. 
(http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/ 2008/04/why-are-there-s.html) (non-
specific) 
(40) An eligible bachelor is a bachelor considered to be a particularly desirable potential husband, 
usually due to wealth, or social status. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eligible_ bachelor) 
(generic) 
 
On the instantiation – superordination continuum (Section 2.2, Figure 1), the three types of indefinite 
NPs, specific, non-specific and generic, involve in that order progressively greater semantic generality, 
with the indefinite generic forming the most ‘schematic’ of the three types of indefinite NP.  
By analysing the indefinite complement of ascriptive-categorizing clauses, e.g. Alice is a thief, 
as non-specific, Langacker (1991: 67) holds that speaker and hearer both conjure up an arbitrary instance 
of the category for the purposes of a specific type attribution. The reference is not specific because the 
instance has no status outside of the predicative construction (Langacker 1991: 68). This is in contrast 
with the indefinite NP an eligible bachelor in (38) where the speaker does have a specific instance in 
mind.  
The variable in specificational-categorizing clauses should, we argue, also be analysed as a non-
specific indefinite NP. The indefinite variable NP itself does not designate a specific individual, but 
construes its referent as an arbitrary instance of the type specifications implied by the variable NP, as in 
another ‘spelling variant of Jahweh’ in (42). However, an important difference with the non-specific 
indefinite NP functioning as ascriptive complement is that a presupposition of existence attaches to the 
indefinite variable in (42), as it does to the definite variable in (41) (Declerck 1988: 14ff). When using 
an indefinite variable NP, such as another version in (42), the speaker conveys that s/he assumes that 
there is ‘an’ instance of the variable in some world. As is required of a presupposition, it remains 
constant under negation. For instance, as a rejoinder to (42) one could say Hayah is not another version, 
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which still presupposes that there is another spelling variant of Jahweh. Non-specific indefinite NPs 
functioning as variables such as another version in (42) can be viewed as the counterpart of weakly 
referring definite NPs functioning as variable, e.g. the most common variant in (41), (Declerck 1988: 
22). The speaker does not have a specific individual in mind, as with the first mention use of indefinite 
NPs illustrated in (38) above, but the indefinite variable NP does designate an existing instance.  
 
(41) [on spelling of name ‘Hookins’] The most common variant is Hookings. (one-
name.org/name_profile/hookins/) 
(42) [on spelling of ‘Jahweh’] Another version was Yeshua or Jeshua. (WB) 
 
The values actually specified for the variable in specificational clauses are typically definite NPs with 
specific reference, such as Hookings in (41) and Yeshua or Jeshua in (42). Specification is brought about 
by the assignment of such specific value(s) to the ‘weakly referring’ variable, be it definite (41) or 
indefinite (42).  
 
4.3 The non-exhaustiveness implicature of specificational-categorizing clauses 
A specificational clause picks out the referents that satisfy the variable from a set, which “is by definition 
an act of selecting (and hence excluding)” (Declerck 1988: 28). Typically, such a selection is expected 
to be exhaustive. However, as pointed out by Lambrecht (2001: 504), there are also some specificational 
constructions that do not have an exhaustiveness implicature like specificational existential clefts such 
as (43): they have a non-exhaustive, “‘listing’ (Rando and Napoli 1978) function”, “denoting members 
of a presupposed open set” (Lambrecht 2001: 504), Adam Smith in (43), that correspond to the variable, 
who’s just building a new one. 
 
(43) A: I’ve really just got to fill them in on lexicographers’ needs just because we’ve been doing a 
lot of it but there’s other people that you think are doing kind of creative corpus lexicography. 
– B: Well, there’s Adam Smith who’s just building a new one.8 (WB).  
 
Categorizing-specificational clauses are very similar9: they do not have an exhaustiveness implicature 
but, on the contrary, imply non-exhaustiveness. The non-exhaustiveness of the specification derives 
                                                 
8 For reasons of privacy, the original Wordbanks example had MX (male proper name). We have provided a 
fictive name to capture the rhetorical effect of the enumerative cleft. 
9 As noted in Section 2.1, non-exhaustive, listing there-clefts are the indefinite counterpart of it-clefts. 
Therefore, the counterpart of reduced it-clefts can be argued to be formed by reduced there-clefts, e.g. Well, 
there’s Adam Smith as corresponding to the there-cleft in (43) (Davidse 2014). Such “reduced” there-clefts can, 
in turn, be argued to be the type of existential known in the literature as “listing” or “enumerative” existentials 
(Abbott 1995): they list entities corresponding to a type given or implied in the previous discourse. An 
enumerative there-cleft can be “reduced” to a listing existential if the variable can be presupposed from the 
preceding text, as in (43). As existentials are not a subtype of copular clause, we will leave listing existentials, 
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directly from the indefiniteness of the variable: since an NP with indefinite reference does not designate 
an instance that is “unique and maximal in relation to the current discourse space” (Langacker 1991: 
98), the relation between the variable and value is not unique or maximal, leaving room for other 
instances corresponding to the schema implied in the variable. Because the variable NP is indefinite, the 
value(s) being specified for it, are construed as a list, enumerating one (44) or more values (45). The 
implicature is that the list is incomplete, but this implicature can be cancelled (cf. Rando & Napoli 1978), 
as in (46). The values specified within the individual clauses are non-exhaustive (since the value picks 
out only one of the possible instantiations of the schema NP), but the metaphor of the four-legged chair 
indicates that all the potential values are listed within the complex sentence. 
 
(44) Another possibility is Channel 5 's Kirsty Young. (WB) 
(45) Other possibilities are Point No Point, Oak Bay, Liplip Point on Marrowstone Island and 
Midchannel Bank. (WB) 
(46) Like a table that needs legs to stand, we need references on which our beliefs can rest. What are 
the references that are going to make your idea stand up? Let us say the idea is that you could 
be slimmer. You have a HABIT of being overweight but an IDEA of being slimmer. One 
reference is to change what you eat, another to be prepared to exercise, another to eat more 
slowly, another to drink more water. Now that your idea has four legs, it can stand. (WB) 
 
4.4 The typical information structures of ascriptive vs. specificational-categorizing clauses 
In Section 3.4 we showed that the contextual disambiguation of identifying specificational and ascriptive 
clauses is greatly helped by their typical information structure and discursive embedding. The reason is 
that a sentence’s information structure typically reflects its communicative function, or as Lambrecht 
(1994: 52) calls it, its “pragmatic assertion”, i.e. what the speaker means to convey by uttering a 
sentence. In this section, we will argue that information structure is also indicative (though not 
constitutive) of the distinction between categorizing specificational and ascriptive clauses. 
The communicative function of specificational clauses is to specify a value for a variable. The 
most pertinent information is thus the value, since in the act of specification the variable is pragmatically 
presupposed (Lambrecht 2001: 474). In terms of discourse-familiarity, the variable is typically 
predictable from the discourse context and the value discourse-new. Example (47) illustrates the typical 
information structure for specificational clauses, as it plays out for categorizing clauses. The variable 
Another interesting political theorist who… links up with the preceding context, whereas the value 
Hannah Arendt is discourse-new information. This discourse-newness naturally maps onto the focal 
status of the value relative to the variable, yielding the type with unmarked, clause-final information 
                                                 
and the idea of viewing them as reduced enumerative there-clefts, out of consideration in the typology of copular 
clauses developed in this article. 
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focus. In (48) the variable, an example of a volcanic rock, is again derivable from the preceding context, 
while the value basalt is discourse-new. Although the semantically specific NP basalt and the general 
NP an example of a volcanic rock are assigned the syntactic functions that are more typically associated 
with an ascriptive reading, their relative discourse-familiarity points out that the value basalt is the 
salient new and therefore the focus of the clause, thus allowing for the clause to be correctly recognized 
as specificational rather than ascriptive. 
 
(47) In the book "The McDonaldization of Society" by George Ritzer, he discusses and provides his 
perspective of the modern world in the view of fast-food restaurant. Another interesting political 
theorist who provides a negative view on the atmosphere that Mcdonaldization has created is 
Hannah Arendt. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonaldization#De-McDonaldization) 
(48) {volcanic rock} A category of igneous rock which comprises those rocks formed from magma 
which has reached the earth's surface. (This is to be contrasted with plutonic rock which forms 
below the surface.) Basalt is an example of a volcanic rock, as are all solidified lavas. (WB) 
 
Ascriptive-categorizing clauses, by contrast, are concerned with describing what the subject is like. 
Therefore, the descriptive complement (the ‘schema’ NP) is typically focal relative to the subject, the 
‘instance’ NP, and this correlates with the further default of the subject being discourse-given and the 
complement discourse-new. Example (49) illustrates the two defaults. In terms of discursive embedding, 
the Peabody Museum has already been introduced in the discourse, but an example of the functional 
school of architecture is new to the discourse (and is itself further developed in the following sentence 
as meaning big, bulky, square, and grey). This helps the reader interpret the information structure of the 
copular clause as having the information focus on the complement NP – and the whole clause as being 
ascriptive-categorizing (in contrast with the specificational-categorizing reading of example (48)). 
 
(49) Zerk found a parking space on the street a couple of blocks from the Peabody Museum. We got 
to the front entrance with ten minutes to spare. We sat on the steps in the dim September sunlight 
to wait for our friend, Daniel F. X. Sullivan. The Peabody Museum is an example of the 
functional school of architecture. It's big, bulky, square, and grey - unmistakably a museum. 
(WB) 
 
As with identifying clauses, a few examples, such as (50), cannot be contextually disambiguated.  
 
(50) I can tell you something though. Something you can mention to the others. It might help them. 
Weldon's disappearance has got nothing to do with your husband. That’s one thing I'm sure 
about.' 
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Its two NPs are discourse-familiar: that refers back to the previously stated proposition that Weldon's 
disappearance has got nothing to do with your husband and the type specifications of one thing I’m sure 
about are also evoked in the preceding context by expressions such as I can tell you something and 
something you can mention to the others. Hence, the context supports a specificational reading in which 
that is the anaphoric, non-contrastive value and one thing I’m sure about the variable, which can be 
pragmatically presupposed because its type specifications are present in the preceding text. On this 
specificational reading, it has the marked information pattern Halliday (1967: 231) pointed out for 
examples like this is what I meant (example (14) above), with the variable rather than the value carrying 
the information focus. But an ascriptive reading is also possible in the context: one thing I’m sure about 
then characterizes the proposition referred to by that as certain for the speaker. The ambiguity of the 
categorizing copular with indefinite complement in (50) is thus parallel with the ambiguity of the 
identifying copular with definite complement discussed for That’s your real interest (35) above.  
 
4.5 Verbal gradability in ascriptive and specificational-categorizing clauses  
In this section, we will be concerned with the grading of the correspondence relation itself between 
instance and schema. We will restrict ourselves to verbal gradability involving explicit degree 
modification (Moreau 2014), i.e. modification expressed by a degree adverb such as very much. As 
noted in Section 2.2, ascriptive-categorizing clauses in principle allow to indicate whether the instance 
designated by the subject corresponds more or less to the prototypical centre of the schema implied in 
the complement, as illustrated by  
 
(51) Ezekiel is very much a visionary. (WB) 
(52) I’m not much of a clergyman. (WB) 
 
In this section, we consider the question if the correspondence relation in specificational-ascriptive 
clauses can also be graded (Van Praet 2013, 2014). 
Logically speaking, verbal gradability is an ascriptive and not a specificational feature: what it 
does is describe how much an instance corresponds to a schema. The basic function of specification, on 
the other hand, is not to say how much an instance corresponds to a schema but simply that it corresponds 
to that schema. Hence, specification is not conducive to verbal gradability. However, unlike 
identification (which necessarily requires a one-on-one relation), categorizing specification does not rule 
out gradability. Extensive corpus and Internet searches yielded a few examples of verbal gradability in 
specificational-ascriptive clauses with clause-initial value, as in (53). In terms of information structure 
Pandora’s Tower in (53) is clearly both discourse-new, i.e. not mentioned in the previous discourse, and 
focal with respect to the pragmatically presupposed variable an example of the difficulty I'd like to see 
in Zelda game. 
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(53) [preceding threads discussed the disappointing ease of the game Zelda, with the immediately 
preceding one mentioning the “Zelda-esque game” Dark Souls as a suitably difficult one]  
Yeah, there are a lot of Zelda clones that do it right. I haven't played Dark Souls yet, but 
Pandora's Tower is very much an example of the difficulty I'd like to see in Zelda game. Even 
Okami, while not super difficult, does feel like the AI has a better idea of what it's doing. 
(http://www.reddit.com/r/zelda/comments/2n5i3v/zelda_needs_a_ better_difficulty_ setting_ 
than_hero/) 
 
By contrast, we found no examples at all of verbal gradability in specificational-categorizing clauses 
with clause-final value and adding very much to attested examples such as (54a) did not produce 
acceptable results, as shown by (54b). 
 
(54) a. A sweet old lady wrote from Dayton, Ohio, that she thought the Bermuda shorts proposed for 
horses in the SINA magazine were a trifle “cumbersome”. “Surely,” she went on, “a better idea 
would be some sort of adhesive covering for the genitals?” The newspapers faithfully 
recorded it all. (WB) 
b. *A better idea would very much be some sort of adhesive covering for the genitals. (WB) 
 
We venture that the reason why gradability is possible (though rare) with specificational-categorizing 
clauses with initial value, but absolutely impossible with ones with final value, has to do with a 
difference in perspective on the relation between instance and schema. Depending on which element is 
subject of the relation, we can view it as profiling a relation of schematicity or one of instantiation. The 
schematicity perspective is typical of specificational-categorizing clauses as it takes the schema, which 
is criterial for the value, as point of departure, as shown in (55a). The instantiation perspective is typical 
of ascriptive-categorizing clauses as it enables recognition of the subject instance as an instance of the 
schema. However, “reversed” specificational-categorizing clauses also construe the value – variable 
relation but from the perspective of the subject instance (55b). 
 
(55) a. Schematicity: schema → instance  (e.g. An example of a volcanic rock is basalt.) 
b. Instantiation: instance → schema  (e.g. Basalt is an example of a volcanic rock.) 
 
Only when a relation of instantiation is profiled can the correspondence relation between an instance 
and a schema be graded: an instance can correspond more or less to a schema, but a schema is always 
fully schematic of an instance (Langacker 1991: 61ff). It is also the instantiation perspective that allows 
the speaker to construe the instance designated by the non-specific indefinite schema NP as a 
prototypical instance, e.g. is very much a visionary (51), is very much an example of the difficulty I'd 
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like to see in Zelda game (53). The grading by a modifier such as very much of the correspondence 
relation locates the instance conjured up in the variable somewhere in the internal structure of the 
category vis-à-vis its prototypical centre. This centre is representative of the abstract conception of the 
schema: the closer to the centre an instance is, the more it corresponds to the conception of the schema; 
the further away from the centre, the less it corresponds with the schema. It is for these reasons, we 
propose, that verbal gradability can only occur in ascriptive-categorizing and reversed specificational-
categorizing clauses. 
 We conclude that the gradability – however marginal – found with specificational-categorizing 
clauses bolsters our argument for approaching categorizing clauses in terms of the correspondence 
relation between instance and schema (rather than in terms of the traditional model of class 
membership).  
 
4.6 Interim conclusion 
In Section 4 we outlined recognition criteria to assign categorizing clauses to either the ascriptive or 
specificational subtype: possible and impossible alternates (4.1), the referential status of the indefinite 
NP (4.2), the non-exhaustiveness implicature of specificational-categorizing clauses (4.3), and the 
typical information structures (4.4). 
 
5 Quantitative instantiation of basic copular types in data sample 
In this final section, we report on the quantitative instantiation of the four basic copular types in an 
extended data sample. The dataset of 2,926 copular clauses was retrieved from WordbanksOnline by 
the following steps. A first step was to extract all the instances of the verb be in all its possible forms by 
means of the query [lemma=“be”]. This maximally open query had to be used because both in the subject 
and object slot members of classes other than noun and adjective had to be allowed for. Non-nominal 
and non-adjectival realizations of subject and complement to be netted included: (i) fused relatives, as 
in That’s what I want, and (ii) members of other classes than nouns that that are functioning in nominal 
slots’, i.e. that are “reclassified” as NPs (Langacker 1991: 148, McGregor 1997: 127-136), e.g. What I’d 
really like to do is go for a swim, The most common favourite colour is blue, The best time is after the 
largest meal of the day. 
Next, a random sample was taken of 6,000 clauses, from which all the non-copular examples 
had to be eliminated. Specifically, we removed all the auxiliary uses of be, existential clauses, and 
clauses with be followed by a predication adjunct (Quirk et al 1985: 985), e.g. Marianne was in the 
garden. In the latter type of clause the complement is probed by interrogative adverbials such as where?, 
not by a probe suggesting anything “categorial” such as what (type of)? (McGregor 1997: 149). We also 
removed complex sentence constructions containing be which are traditionally not subsumed under 
copular sentences proper such as extraposition, e.g. It’s likely that this story will come out anyway, and 
full-fledged it-clefts.  
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This left us with a dataset of 2,926 copular clauses, which we analysed, applying all the 
recognition criteria discussed in Sections 2, 3 and 4. The four copular types were instantiated in the 
relative proportions indicated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Relative proportions of the four types of copular clauses 
 Ascription 
Ascription / 
Specification 
Specification 
Categorizing 
Adjectival
Compl. 
1459 
(49.86%) 2174 
(74.30%) 
2  
(0.07%) 
7  
(0.24%) Nominal 
Compl. 
715 
(24.44%) 
Categorizing / 
Identifying 
26 (0.89%) / / 
Identifying 336 (11.48%) 43 (1.47%) 
Reversible 
240 
(8.20%) 338 
(11.55%) Reduced 
it-Cleft 
98 
(3.35%) 
 
Ascriptive-categorizing clauses make up the largest proportion of the sample with 74.30%, of which 
49.86% has an adjectival complement. Copular clauses with two NPs together make up only half of the 
dataset, of which 24.75% is categorizing and 24.45 identifying. Between the ascriptive-categorizing and 
ascriptive-identifying clauses, there is an area of ambiguity, 0.89%, occupied mainly by examples whose 
complement contains a possessive or genitive, e.g. ‘Are you Mr Tedeschi's friend?' I replied that I wasn't 
exactly his friend, more his colleague (9). 
Of the copulars with two NPs, half, 24.44%, is ascriptive-categorizing. Specificational-
categorizing clauses form a small fraction, 0.24%, of the whole dataset, as well as very much a minority 
option within the categorizing clauses with two NPs, of which they form 1%. This confirms the 
observations in the literature about their infrequency (e.g. Mikkelsen 2005: 154-155). Yet, as we have 
shown in Section 4, the specificational-categorizing type is a logical subtype of the oppositions within 
the copular system. The description of copular clauses that we propose also allows us to naturally 
accommodate the few examples that are ambiguous between an ascriptive-categorizing and a 
specificational-categorizing reading (0.07%), such as That’s one thing I'm sure about (50), discussed in 
Section 4.4.  
Within the identifying clauses, the ascriptive and specificational subtype are represented by 
similar proportions of 11.5% in our dataset. However, of the 11.55% of specificational-identifying 
clauses, 30% is formed by reduced it-clefts10. The latter do not require the specific discursive embedding 
that reversible specificational copulars need for their two NPs, the value and the overtly expressed 
variable. The reversible specificational-identifying clauses and the ascriptive-identifying clauses 
                                                 
10 As argued in Section 4.1, the functional counterpart of the reduced it-cleft is the reduced there-cleft, which, 
however, we leave out of this typology of copular clauses because it is a subtype of existential construction. 
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intersect in ambiguous examples, parallel to the ambiguous examples between specificational-
categorizing and ascriptive categorizing clauses, and supported by the same types of textual embedding, 
as discussed for That’s your real interest (35) in Section 3.4.  
 
6 Final conclusion 
In existing approaches to English copular clauses one finds two different basic splits whose areas of 
overlap remained unclear. One tradition takes the ascription – specification opposition as the central 
divide and the other focuses on the predication (or “categorization”) – identification opposition. We 
argued that these are two distinct oppositions the cross-classification of which results in a fourfold 
typology that distinguishes between ascriptive-categorizing, specificational-categorizing, ascriptive-
identifying and specificational-identifying, clauses. In this article we developed this fourfold typology, 
arguing that it does more justice to the semantics of the main subtypes than traditional approaches and 
that it brings out the main similarities and differences between the subtypes better. In particular, we 
argued that categorizing clauses are best analysed as profiling a correspondence relation between an 
instance and a schema, which can be construed either ascriptively (the traditional predicative clause) or 
specificationally. They differ from identifying clauses, which express that the referents of two definite 
terms coincide in the same entity. Identifying clauses can also be construed either ascriptively or 
specificationally (Section 2).  
In Section 3, we focused on the two types of identifying clauses. Our distinction between 
ascriptive-identifying and specificational-identifying clauses corresponds largely to that between 
descriptionally-identifying and specificationally-identifying clauses developed by Higgins (1976) and 
Declerck (1988). As stressed by them, specification and identification should not be conflated. We made 
a plea for a description that looks at their communicative function and information structure in real 
contexts.  
In Section 4 we dealt with the two types of categorizing clauses, showing that ascriptive and 
categorizing clauses cannot be conflated either, even though they have been in traditional conceptions 
of the ‘predicative’ copular clause. While distinguishing the ascriptive-categorizing from the neglected 
specificational-categorizing type, we also stressed that they both construe a correspondence relation 
between a specific instance and the schema implied in the more general NP, which allowed us to explain 
the gradability that is typically associated with them.  
The distinction between ascription and specification that subclassifies both the identifying and the 
categorizing type was substantiated in terms of four distinguishing features: (i) (non) reversibility, (ii) 
the different semantic generality and referentiality of the arguments of the copula, (iii) the absence or 
presence of a (non) exhaustiveness implicature and (iv) the typical information structures of the clauses. 
In Section 5 we reported on the quantitative instantiation in an extended data sample of the four basic 
copular types, identified in terms of these recognition criteria. Future research along the lines outlined 
in this article will, on the basis of qualitative and quantitative corpus-based research, have to dig further 
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into subtypes and marked mappings, particularly ones involving the different referential types of the 
NPs and the typical information structures. It may well be that this will lead to the distinguishing of 
further subtypes within the basic typology proposed in this article.  
. 
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